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Abstract—External  border surveillance   is  critical to  the se- 
curity of every  state and the challenges  it poses are  changing 
and likely to intensify.  Wireless  Sensor Networks  (WSN) are 
a low cost technology  that provide  an intelligence-led  solution 
to effective continuous monitoring  of large,  busy and complex 
landscapes.  The linear network topology  resulting  from the 
structure of the monitored area raises challenges that have not 
been adequately addressed in the literature to date. In this paper, 
we identify an appropriate metric to measure the quality of WSN 
border crossing detection. Furthermore,   we propose  a method 
to calculate the required number of sensor nodes to deploy in 
order to achieve a specified level  of coverage according  to the 
chosen  metric in a given  belt region,  while maintaining radio 
connectivity  within the network. Then, we contribute  a novel 
cross layer  routing protocol, called Levels Division Graph (LDG), 
designed specifically  to address  the communication   needs and 
link reliability for topologically  linear WSN applications.  The 
performance of the proposed protocol is extensively evaluated  in 
simulations using realistic conditions and parameters. LDG simu- 
lation results show significant performance  gains when compared 
to its best rival in the literature, Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). 
Compared to DSR, LDG improves the average end-to-end delays 
by up to 95%, packet delivery ratio by up to 20%, and throughput 
by up to 60%, while maintaining  comparable  performance  in 
terms of normalized routing load and energy consumption. 
 
Index Terms—Chain-type   wireless  sensor  networks, WSN 
routing protocols,  media access  control, border security  and 
surveillance, linear networks, network coverage and connectivity, 
strong barrier, weak barrier. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Securing international  borders is a  complex task that in- 
volves international collaboration, deployment of advanced 
technological solutions and professional skill-sets. However, 
there are many factors hindering the development of an effec- 
tive system for international  border security and surveillance. 
In the current tight financial climate, governments strive  to 
secure their borders, but also ensure that costs are kept low. 
This is particularly challenging to achieve  given very long 
land and maritime borders.  For instance,  the external  land 
border of the EU from 1 January 2007 is 7.958 km and the 
maritime borders are nearly 80.000 km long [1]. With borders 
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of this length, a very large number of trained border guards and 
resources are essential. Training  and equipping  border guards 
is very expensive. Moreover, it is not always feasible to deploy 
border guards along the borders due to the hostile topography, 
severe weather conditions,  and political or military conflicts. 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technology offers an 
intelligence-led, cost effective solution for monitoring vulner- 
able points on the international  borders. A WSN is a set of 
resource-constrained  devices that monitor the environmental 
conditions. A network of unattended self-organizing  sensors 
can significantly cut the number  of personnel  in a border 
agency. Additionally,  the continuous  monitoring   reduces the 
chances of missing any potential criminal activity. The ability 
of a  WSN to operate  without human involvement and in 
situations where other surveillance  technologies are imprac- 
tical has made it favorite for deployment in hostile hazardous 
environments. Yet WSNs can be easily integrated with existing 
systems  to provide a  common data set  at every  point of 
intervention.  Data integration from multiple systems is a key 
feature of modern day border control  and surveillance  systems. 
Some  WSN applications   impose  a linear network topol- 
ogy, e.g., international border security, gas/petrol pipeline 
monitoring and rail track monitoring. The linear topology 
has nodes  daisy chained using radio communication. Linear 
WSN (LWSN) topologies are characterized by sparse node de- 
ployment, long transmission distances, and alignment of nodes 
along a virtual line. This range of characteristics introduces 
new challenges that make solutions  proposed for traditional 
WSNs inapplicable to LWSNs. 
The current research in LWSNs addresses problems  as they 
arise from a  narrow application perspective.  For instance, 
many routing protocols were proposed for pipeline monitoring 
applications [2], [3], [4]. In such protocols, data collection  is 
typically accomplished through specialized mobile or power- 
rich nodes. In border security, this is not always possible. For 
example,  in wild forests,  it is unfeasible  for an unmanned 
vehicle to bypass large natural  obstacles. Therefore,  there is 
a need to tackle the problem fundamentally at the topological 
level. This paper contributes   a  cross layer communication 
protocol that is tailored to address the requirements of LWSNs. 
We apply this protocol to border security and surveillance  as it 
presents a complex  set of challenges that are generic enough to 
cover most LWSN  applications. Routing deals with issues such 
as data reliability, timeliness, error rate, network lifetime, and 
system scalability;  these determine the success of any WSN 
system. 
The rest of this paper is organized   as follows. Section II 
 
 
 
surveys  routing protocols  designed for LWSN applications. 
Section III  presents an architecture for LWSN-based  border 
surveillance  system. Section  IV  identifies and evaluates  the 
quality of intruder detection metrics and their suitability for a 
border monitoring  applications. Section V presents the details 
of network segmentation and inter-cluster routing protocol. In 
Section VI, the path simulation  and routing evaluation results 
are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
and future work is suggested. 
 
II.  RELATED WORK 
In [5] a hybrid WSN architecture for border patrol systems 
is described. The main contribution  of this paper is to outline 
techniques from the literature to calculate node density  and 
determine the number  as well as the location of monitoring 
towers. However, the cost of such a system is extremely high 
and its multi-phase  sensing could introduce significant re- 
porting  delays. The collaboration  between sensors in different 
layers requires complex coordination techniques. Furthermore, 
the integration of the multimodal  data is not a trivial task. 
More recently, a  border intrusion detection system that 
aims to enhance the coverage quality and detection accuracy 
has been proposed  in [6]. A model to calculate the amount 
of redundancy required  to guarantee  the quality of sensing 
coverage is presented. The authors do not give the full details 
of the model and ignore the practical difficulties of node 
deployment. Moreover,  the claims made  by the authors  on 
reduced false alarms, determining  the direction of crossing, 
detection accuracy were not verified experimentally. 
A maritime border surveillance system was proposed in [7]. 
It focuses on distinguishing  between ship-generated waves and 
ocean waves.The  main limitation of [7] is that it requires  a 
dense network  to achieve low miss-rate, especially with small 
vessels,  because  of the high noise in the sea.  Additionally, 
it is based on a grid network topology, which is difficult to 
realize in real-world deployments such as dropping  nodes from 
a plane. 
The work in [8] presents an energy-aware routing protocol 
for WSN-based border surveillance.  The authors  propose  a 
routing  algorithm  that splits sensor nodes to several scheduling 
sets and keeps track  of the energy level of each sensor node. 
This algorithm is based on the routing algorithm published 
in [9], which addresses  the m-coverage  and n-connectivity 
problem. This routing algorithm  considers the scenario where 
the heterogeneous  sensor nodes are randomly distributed in 
a  circular region, which renders  it  unsuitable  for  border 
surveillance applications. 
In [10], a  set  of well-known routing protocols,  Ad hoc 
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV), Optimized Link State 
Routing Protocol (OLSR) and DSR, were simulated  using 
OPNET. It was found that DSR performs  better than other 
protocols in  border surveillance  applications.  The authors 
propose a minor modification to DSR to achieve better energy 
management in border surveillance applications. The proposed 
modification does  not achieve  significant energy  gains and 
is hardware platform specific. The study focuses on energy 
consumption without giving any attention to any quality-of- 
data or Quality-of-Services  (QoS) aspects. 
FleGSens [11] is basic system for area surveillance  using 
only simple passive  infrared sensors  for trespass detection. 
It focuses on ensuring integrity and authenticity of reported 
events in the presence of an attacker who may compromise 
a limited number of nodes. The network itself follows a grid 
topology. The hop-based routing ignores load balancing and 
link reliability, which are critical in hostile environments and 
could have considerable  impact on the packet delivery ratio 
and timeliness. Moreover, the grid topology  does not match 
the requirements of international  border applications,  which 
typically favor linear topologies. Relying on such assumptions 
limits the scalability  and usability of [11]. 
It  is evident  from the literature survey  that there is no 
systematic  approach to the application  of WSNs to border 
security and surveillance. Most reviewed systems are built with 
narrow application  objectives in mind. There is no serious 
attempt  to address  the fundamental  challenges imposed  by 
large-scale border security and surveillance at the topological 
level. The linear structure of the network topology necessitates 
new solutions not only at the application level, but also at 
the data link and application levels. As the network infras- 
tructure becomes  more complex, it  needs  to accommodate 
several applications.  These applications have many, potentially 
conflicting, requirements  such  as timeliness,  reliability, data 
accuracy and energy efficiency. It is important to accommodate 
these requirements  before a generic  architecture  for linear- 
based  WSN that covers  a  wide spectrum  of application is 
realized. 
 
 
III.  SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 
Most of the current WSN systems for area monitoring  are 
multi-layered  systems. To overcome the drawbacks of multi- 
layered systems, explained  in Section II, we propose  a flat, 
modular  system architecture  to offer timely, mission-centric 
event  detection.  The proposed  architecture  is open to any 
hardware platform  and does not assume any sensing modality. 
Flat systems  comprise  a set of Basic Sensor Nodes  (BSN), 
which collaborate to detect and report events. 
Conventional  border surveillance  systems rely on of fixed 
checkpoints, Monitoring Towers (MT), mobile vehicles, and 
border guards. Border guards could be equipped with man- 
pack antennas. The proposed network  architecture builds on 
top of the existing border surveillance infrastructure. BSNs are 
deployed in unattended ground to provide higher granularity 
for monitoring. 
Surveillance  towers,  which may be stationary or mobile, 
e.g., armored vehicle dispatched to incident, collect and route 
data to the wired network. Surveillance towers can host power- 
ful and reliable  multimedia  sensors, i.e., radars and cameras. 
Information from BSNs and the multimedia  sensors can be 
fused at the MT to reduce the false alarm rate. After the MT 
confirms an intrusion reported by a BSN(s),  they report the 
intrusion location to the remote control and command center. 
Due to coverage considerations  and to reduce  the miss- 
rate, the number of deployed BSN(s) is expected to be very 
large. Hence, the network is divided into several  segments. 
A  segment  comprises  a  MT and the BSNs to its left and 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A sketch of the system architecture  adopted in this work. 
 
 
right, which transmit their data to it. Similarly, MTs coordinate 
with each other to improve the detection rate. The details of 
the segmentation  process are given in Section V. Figure 1, 
sketches the described network architecture. 
 
 
IV.  DETECTION QUALITY AND SENSOR DENSITY 
 
In this section we consider how to determine the required 
network width and node density for a  border surveillance 
network. Coverage is a crucial metric to determine the capacity 
of  monitoring. Connectivity ensures  that the data can be 
delivered to the base-station with the specified QoS guaran- 
tee. In the context of border security,  the problem is often 
formulated  as a k-barrier  of a belt region [8], [12], [13], [14]. 
For border surveillance  applications,  it is assumed  that the 
intruders attempt to cross the width of the belt. A belt is a 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the sensor deployment simulation.  The 
red sensor disc and path illustrate  the implementation  of the cyclic boundary 
condition. 
 
 
paths orthogonal to the border region, and this corresponds to 
DetQM in the limiting case when the probability  of following 
TFP is 1, and the TFP region has zero width. 
In the remainder of this section, we attempt to answer two 
important questions: (1) What is the appropriate metric in or- 
der to measure the detection quality  of the network? (2) What 
is the required number of sensor nodes to deploy to achieve a 
specified level of coverage according to the chosen metric in a 
given belt region, while maintaining radio connectivity within 
the network?  To answer  these questions,  we compare  four 
metrics of detection quality as functions  of the BSN density 
for parameters appropriate  for a  border intrusion detection 
network: PS , the probability of strong barrier formation, PW , 
region bounded by two approximately parallel curves. A given 
belt region is said to be k-barrier  covered if all crossing paths
 the probability of weak barrier formation, P⊥ 
of detection of orthogonal paths and 
, the probability 
quantities 
through the region are k-covered, i.e., they overlap at least k 
sensors. 
Barrier coverage can be further subdivided into strong and 
weak. [12] introduce the notion of strong k-barrier formation, 
in which there are k disjoint strong barriers crossing the region. 
[13] derive a condition  on the sensor density required to form 
a k-barrier  with high probability.  Several subsequent authors 
have developed algorithms  for finding strong barriers in an 
already-deployed network in some optimal way [15]. 
A weak barrier is one in which all orthogonal crossing paths 
overlap the sensing area of at least one network  node. Exact 
and approximate  expressions for the probability of formation 
of a  weak barrier with a  given node density are given by 
[16]. Similarly to strong barriers, we can define  a weak k- 
barrier as one in which all orthogonal crossing paths overlap at 
least k nodes. A condition for the formation of weak k-barriers 
was derived  by [12]. [17] derive  bounds on the probability 
of  formation of  weak k-barriers, and present  an efficient 
algorithm for determining  whether a  given deployment  of 
sensors satisfies  the weak k-coverage condition,  and if  not, 
what fraction of the region is covered. 
[18] introduced the DetQM metric. This is the probability 
that an intruder is detected by at least one node, integrated over 
all possible straight line paths through the sensing region, with 
a certain probability  that an intruder  travels through a narrow 
corridor called the Trespasser’s  Favorite Path (TFP) region. 
They conclude that DetQM is significantly  reduced when the 
probability of following TFPs is high. In fact, the probability 
DetQM. These 
are calculated  either by applying the appropriate  analytical 
formulae or are derived from using monte-carlo  methods, 
where no closed form exists. 
We consider a rectangular border region of width w along 
the border direction, and depth h  normal to  the border, 
in which sensors  are randomly  deployed with a  mean  line 
density ρ. The mean surface density of sensors in the region 
is therefore σ = ρ/h.  The sensors deployed  in the region 
have a sensing radius  r, with the probability p of sensing an 
intruder given by the binary model, that is for a sensor  at  rs 
and intruder  at  ri , p = 1 for |rs − ri | < r, 0 otherwise. The 
simulation  domain used for the calculations in this section (and 
the path simulations of section VI-A) is shown schematically 
in Figure 2. 
 
A. Detection probability and DetQM 
[19] show that in the limit where the sensing region is large 
compared to the individual sensors, the probability of detection 
of a  path is distributed  according to a Poisson  distribution. 
An intruder is detected by any sensors  which are within a 
distance r of the path: the expectation value of the number of 
sensors within r of an orthogonal path is simply 2ρr, so the 
probability of there being no such sensor is 
P0 = e
−2ρr 
 
(from the Poisson distribution)  and hence the probability of 
detection of orthogonal  paths is 
of detection is minimum when intruders follow straight line P⊥ = 1 − P0 = 1 − e− 
2ρr . 
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Figure 3.   a.  Comparison   of DetQM and P⊥  b. P⊥,  PW    (approximate 
formula),  and PS  (Monte-Carlo) 
 
 
 
It is straightforward to show that DetQM tends to P⊥ as the 
width of the TFP region tends to zero, and the TFP probability 
tends to one. Figure 3a shows values of DetQM plotted against 
sensor density for w = 2000m, h = 100m and various values 
of the TFP parameters (two cases with wt  = 100m, and the 
limiting case pt  = 1, wt  → 0. Note that since the expression 
for DetQM contains   a  singularity at wt   = 0, we set  this 
parameter to a small value (10−6 m) in order to approach the 
limit.  The figure confirms that DetQM tends  to P⊥  in the 
limit, and that even with pt  = 0.5, DetQM overestimates the 
detection probability  considerably compared to P⊥. 
 
B. Radio Communication 
The probability that a  node can communicate  with  at 
least one other node can also be derived from the Poisson 
distribution. The expectation  value of the number  of node 
centers within the radio communication  distance Rradio   of a 
found, then the sensor field has strong barrier coverage. Note 
that if either boundary  has no overlapping  sensors, there can 
not be a strong  barrier. 
Figure 3b shows P⊥, PW  (from [16]’s formulation)  and Ps 
for two barrier heights  as functions of sensor  line density. 
Note that strong barrier coverage is dependent on the height 
of the barrier region, and is less likely for the larger value 
of h, since strong barrier formation depends on the surface 
density of sensors.We  see that forming a strong  barrier  with 
high probability  requires a much higher density of sensors than 
are needed to form a weak barrier  with the same probability. 
 
 
D. Discussion 
DetQM is seen  to overestimate  the probability of detec- 
tion of intruders, and hence to systematically under-specify 
the sensor density.  This is acknowledged by [18] who note 
that trespasser’s favorite paths should  be taken into account. 
However, we argue that in the absence of knowledge of the 
details of intruders’ movements  (and any TFP regions)  we 
should make the assumption that intruders are acting in order 
to minimize their probability of detection. We must further 
assume  that intruders have  no knowledge  of the locations 
or sensing  ranges  of the sensors,  in which case  they will 
achieve this goal by taking the shortest possible path through 
the border region. This argument  has also been used by [17] 
as  a  justification for using weak barrier coverage,  in which 
all such paths are detected. We therefore argue that P⊥, the 
probability of detection of intruders who minimize their risk 
of detection, is a better measure of the detection quality of the 
network than DetQM. In any case, P⊥ is the most conservative 
measure based on detection probability  since it is formally the 
lower limit; furthermore, DetQM tends to this limit if the most 
given node is πρR2 /h,  and hence the probability that a conservative  assumptions are made. 
node can communicate  is 
Pradio  = 1 − e−ρπRradio /h 
Since Rradio   is typically ≈ 2r, we find that 
Pradio  > P⊥ if   h ;S 2πr 
For typical deployments  (say, r = 25m and h  = 100m) 
this condition is easily  satisfied  so nodes connect with high 
probability, when P⊥ is also high. 
 
C. Barrier Coverage 
We calculate the probability of strong barrier coverage using 
a  Monte-Carlo approach.  For strong barrier coverage,  we 
require that there are no possible paths crossing the domain, 
which do not intersect at least one sensor’s detection  region. 
This is equivalent to finding a continuous chain of overlapping 
sensing regions, which also overlaps both edges of the domain 
in the x  direction. The calculation  proceeds by deploying 
random  sensor fields, and searching  for strong barriers  by 
constructing  a graph in which each vertex  represents a sensor, 
and the edges are the lines joining the sites of pairs of sensors 
with overlapping  sensing regions. We then perform  a depth- 
first search of the graph, seeking a path from one edge of the 
domain to the other. If the traversal is successful and a path is 
We  show that metrics based  on barrier formation will 
potentially  over-specify  the network.  For the same probability, 
barrier formation requires much higher sensor  density than 
path detection. Using barrier formation  as a metric also leaves 
open the question of how many intruders are likely to penetrate 
the network. For example, with strong barrier formation we 
know the probability that no intruders will  penetrate, but in 
the cases  where no barrier is formed we have  no measure 
of the likely rate of intrusion. A detection probability-based 
metric can easily be included in any analysis which seeks to 
compare the cost of deployment with some  measure of the 
cost of intrusions. 
Finally, we note that in a  real deployment, the algorithm 
due to [17] can be run centrally and concurrently within each 
barrier segment to provide an estimate of P⊥, by calculating 
the weak barrier fraction. 
 
V.  NETWORK SEGMENTATION AND INTER-CLUSTER 
COMMUNICATION 
In this section we present  a new LWSN segmentation and 
communication  protocol with  the aim of  reducing energy 
usage and transmission delays whilst maintaining or improving 
the system’s quality of service. Reduction  of energy  usage 
requires careful attention to the network topology during its 
 
 
 
initialization phase. During  this, a network connectivity graph 
is built by the MTs. Each local MT is assigned level 0. BSNs 
are assigned to various logical network levels in a breadth-first 
order. In effect, the level of a BSN is directly proportional to 
the number of hops to reach the MT. Occasional connectivity 
updates are used to deal with temporal changes in the wireless 
channel. 
The allocation of BSNs to network levels is critical since the 
amount of energy consumed by each BSN varies relative to its 
location from its MT. BSNs in the lowest network levels suffer 
greater power  consumption,  because data from higher levels 
travel through them to reach the MT. Simultaneously,  border 
surveillance  applications  require immediate notification of 
time sensitive information. BSNs in the highest network levels, 
i.e., nodes located farthest from the MT, experience the longest 
delays. Therefore we focus our analysis on the transmission 
delays of these BSNs. The communication  protocol described 
is general-purpose and cross-layer. It is designed to address 
with the aforementioned requirements of a LWSN. 
 
A. Energy Balancing by Limiting the Transmission Distance 
We propose applying transmission power control techniques 
to achieve energy savings in lower network levels. We aim 
to balance energy consumption  across a network  segment by 
dynamically adjusting BSNs transmission power based on their 
network level. When increasing the distance traveled at each 
hop, the end-to-end  delay decreases at the cost of higher power 
consumption [20]. For a shorter per-hop transmission distance, 
less energy  is consumed  due to lower transmission  power, 
while end-to-end delay increases linearly proportional to the 
number of hops on the path to the sink. Therefore, limiting 
the transmission  distance/power  of BSNs in lower network 
levels is expected to reduce their energy expenditure enough to 
compensate for the high-workload they incur. Similarly, BSNs 
in higher network levels transfer data over longer distance to 
the reduce-end-to end delay. 
A BSN transmission power model needs  to consider the 
hardware  design of  a  node and the requirements  of  the 
communication   standards. The power of a  certain signal is 
calculated  as 
modulation methods  with  a  higher bit/baud ratio. This is 
particularly beneficial, because adjusting the bandwidth  based 
on the current workload  increases energy savings. 
 
B. LDG: A Routing Protocol for LWSNs 
The main objectives of the Levels Division Graph (LDG) 
protocol are: (1) To organize BSNs into network segments; 
(2) To allocate BSNs according to a communication  cost and 
reliability into smaller manageable levels; and (3) To establish 
the shortest/most cost-efficient/most reliable link to the MT. 
We assume that each MT is equipped with a bi-directional 
antenna.  Messages  are labeled left or right  depending  on 
which transceiver  they are sent over. The LDG algorithm 
is  initialized by  each MT  broadcasting  beacon messages 
(called level_msg) containing its ID,  direction (left  or 
right), levelk , and synchronization information.  In the initial 
level_msg, levelk  is set to 0 and the broadcast transmission 
power is limited to rs (the maximum radio range of a BSN). 
All BSNs that receive the initial level_msg set their level 
to L1   or R1   depending  on the direction of that message. 
BSNs in levels L1   or R1   can communicate  with the MT 
directly. Having several  direct links with the MT provides 
fault tolerance and load balancing. BSNs in higher levels use 
a  backoff mechanism to delay any actions on the received 
level_msg. During the backoff time, BSNs wait to receive 
all potential level_msg.  At the end of the backoff time, 
every BSN chooses the ‘best’ level_msg it received. The 
source of the best level_msg is recorded as the next hop to 
the MT. The ‘best’ message is defined in Subsection V-C. Each 
BSN down the communication tree increments the received 
level value by 1 and adds the cost of its link to the received 
cumulative  path cost. Using the received level and path cost 
information, BSNs determine which MT to join. 
The level_msg broadcast process continues until the left 
direction of the MT at one end of the segment meets the right 
direction of the MT at the other end of the segment. Nodes 
located at the level where the two directions  meet choose to 
join the nearest MT over the most reliable link and do not 
re-broadcast any level_msg. 
p = ρS0 d
−α E 
 
where ρ is the fixed transmitter power, S0 is the channel gain 
between typical Tx-Rx, d is the distance between Tx-Rx, and α 
is the path-loss exponent (α > 2). The distance is estimated 
from the Received Signal Strength (RSS) as 
D(km) = 10(L−32.44−20log(f ))/20 
where L  is the maximum path loss and f is the signal 
frequency in MHz. 
The proposed  power control technique  can also be used 
by MAC protocols to improve the probability of successful 
data transmissions.  Moreover, the number of  collisions is 
expected to decrease as only nodes with overlapping coverage 
will  contend to access  the medium. This improves network 
bandwidth utilization, reduces the hidden and exposed terminal 
problems,  and reduces  end-to-end  delays. At  the physical 
layer, using a  higher transmission power allows coding and 
C. Link Selection in LDG Algorithm 
BSNs use  a  cost metric to choose  the ‘best’ MT  and 
the ‘best’ parent to reach that MT. The cost metric defines 
the effective path as  the shortest, most reliable, and energy 
efficient path. It accommodates the effects of communication 
interference resulting from simultaneous transmissions. Infor- 
mation about link quality is provided by the MAC layer. The 
data routing tree is built based on the quality  of the link and the 
residual energy of all nodes up the tree. The paths offering  high 
energy level, but poor link quality, or vice versa, are given high 
cost to avoid coverage/communication  holes Similarly, paths 
having high residual energy and poor link quality suffer from 
high bit error rate, which leads to increased retransmissions 
causing energy depletion and high end-to-end delay. 
The proposed cost metric incorporates the residual energy 
of the potential  parent, distance to reach it and the quality 
of the link connecting the two nodes. The cost of the link 
 
 
 
used for sending 1 bit from BSNs i in leveli   to node j in 
adjacent levelj  can be calculated  as follows 
 
C ost (i, j) = 
d (i, j) Ei 
Lq (i, j) 
× 
Ej 
where d(i, j)  is the distance between i and j ,  Lq  is the i-j 
link quality indicator,  and Ei  and Ej  are the residual energy 
of i and j , respectively. The Ei/Ej    is introduced to increase 
the communication  cost with BSNs with low residual energy. 
The link  quality approximations  depend on the Channel 
State Information  (CSI). In this work, we adopt the RSS as the 
link quality indicator.  RSS is widely adopted in the literature 
for this purpose. It was proven  that the RSS, if higher than 
about −87dBm, correlates closely with the PDR [21]. The 
overall cost of the link, including the end-to-end  delay, is 
calculated  as 
C ostl (i, j) = w (i, j)
α × (Ld )
β
 
where α and β are non-negative  integers and Ld  is the delay 
incurred on the link. α and β are constants of proportionality 
for the weight adjustment.  The link  end-to-end  delay can 
be calculated using the method described in [22]. If  no re- 
ceived level_msg advertisements satisfy both requirements 
of energy efficiency  and low end-to-end delay, then the BSN 
with maximum  energy and CSI value below the β threshold 
will  be selected  as the next hop or the minimum CSI with 
energy above the α threshold will be selected as the next hop 
candidate. 
The algorithm for the parent selection considers the full path 
to the MT to ensure that the algorithm  equalizes the length of 
the segment and balances its membership. The cumulative path 
is the summation of the weights of individual links forming 
the path from the node to the MT. The cumulative  path cost 
is given  as 
C ost(i, M T ) = 
) 
wt (i, ip ) . . . wt (j, bs) 
 
where i is to be associated with M T , ip  is the parent of i, 
and j is the vertex of edges connecting  the last BSN in the 
path to the MT forming the path, P , from i to bs. 
 
D. Communication  Phase 
In this phase, BSNs send notifications  to their MT. Each 
BSN on the route to the MT updates the path residual energy 
level in the transmitted message. When energy levels of any 
BSN node drop below a  critical threshold,   a local path re- 
configuration  process is started. The low-power BSN sends 
a  path_update message asking all neighboring  nodes to 
advertise their cost value. This message contains  the ID of 
the previous node on the path   (np ).  Upon receiving the 
path_update, np  enters into a maintenance state and starts 
its backoff timer. All nodes hearing the path_update message 
except np  respond by sending  a level_update message, 
which is the same  as  the level_msg.  Only nodes  in the 
maintenance state read the level_update messages. At the 
end of the backoff time, np  selects a new parent offering the 
best path. Path updates are not expected to occur frequently, 
because load-balancing  is one of the main design factors  of 
the cost metric used to establish routes to the MT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Shifted sleep/wake scheme. 
 
 
E. LWSN Duty Cycle 
In this subsection, we present the design of a synchronous 
wake-up-scheduling   scheme for LWSNs that adheres to the 
unidirectional  end-to-end delay constraints  posed  by large- 
scale border surveillance applications. Each node at level li−1 
has  parents  Pn   at level l.  We  denote one period of  the 
wake-up cycle as an interval  and we examine Pn consecutive 
intervals BSNs in every level apply the same wake-up pattern 
in their corresponding interval and sleep in the other Pn − 1 
intervals.  For instance, in a  basic periodic wake-up  pattern 
where Pn = 2, every node is assigned two parents p1 and p2 . 
If  p1  is awake,  p2  can go to sleep  and vice versa.  In this 
setup, the child node views  the same pattern as in the always- 
up single parent  case and enjoy the same  chances  to send 
a message. Therefore,  the end-to-end delay stays unchanged 
while BSNs wake up Pn  times less frequently  as the single- 
parent case. Consequently,  the formula for delay distribution 
is the same as in the single-parent case, but the effective  wake 
up time is scaled down by a factor of Pn . During any interval, 
a  BSN may wake up several  times. The effective  wake up 
period is calculated  as 
t 
T =   lim 
{t→∞} Nt 
where Nt  is the number of wake-ups in period t. This means 
that BSNs wake up once every T sec. In the multi-parent  case, 
the effective wake up period is t/Pn . 
At the network layer level, the receive-send-sleep cycle is 
implemented by shifting the wake-up pattern of the BSNs in 
even levels by T/2.  T  is the length of the wake up period. 
In this scheduling  scheme, the worst-case  delay is when a 
message is generated by a child immediately after the wake- 
up of the parent of the node. In this scenario, the first hop 
needs T seconds and the following (h−1) hops each needs T/2 
seconds. The worst-case end-to-end delay is (h+1)T/2  and the 
distribution of delay is D = h/2T . 
This wake up shifting scheme reduces the end-to-end delay 
by half when compared to fully synchronized  schemes, where 
all BSNs in the network wake up at the same time based on 
a fixed T . The overall distribution delay in the multi-parent 
case is D = h/2Pn T . Finally, we note that for a given sleep 
schedule, we simply adjust the BSN density required for a 
given sensor coverage  by a constant  factor corresponding to 
the mean duty cycle of the BSN. This is because at any one 
 
 
 
time, the randomly  deployed  nodes will  still be distributed 
according to a Poisson  distribution. 
 
VI.  EVALUATION 
A. Monte-Carlo Simulations 
In this section we describe  experiments  using a  Monte- 
Carlo simulation code which computes  the probabilities of 
intruder detection and of strong and weak barrier coverage. 
Let x be the coordinate along the border region, and y the 
coordinate normal to x. The simulation domain is bounded by 
x ∈ [0, w], y ∈ [−h/2−r, h/2+r]. Sensors are deployed in the 
region x ∈ [0, w], y ∈ [−h/2, h/2]. The boundaries at x = 0 
and x = w are cyclic, so that intruder  paths, which cross one 
of these boundaries are continued from the opposite boundary. 
The cyclic boundary condition for sensors is implemented by 
simply  replicating  any sensor in x ∈ [w − r, w] at xt = w − x, 
and any sensor in x ∈ [0, r] at xt = w + x. 
In order to investigate the effects of the movement pattern of 
intruders on the detection probability,  and validate the choice 
of P⊥  as  a  metric for detection  quality, we carried out a 
series of monte carlo simulations of intruder movement. We 
model the movement of intruders  as piecewise  linear paths, 
which start at y  = h/2 + r and end at y  =  −h/2 − r. 
The path segments are chosen randomly  from a distribution 
in which the length of the segment is uniformly distributed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a b 
 
 
Figure 5. a. Comparison  of analytical formulae for coverage with simulation 
results. b. An ensemble of simulations with random path parameters. Each 
marker  represents a complete  run of the simulation with a randomly  chosen 
distribution of path parameters and BSN density. 
 
 
simulation  chose random values for the parameters controlling 
the intruder path distribution (ρ, L0 , L1 , subject to the con- 
straint L1  > L0 , and ∆θ). We use w = 2000m, h = 100m, 
r = 25m, 1m < L0  < 100m, L0  < L1  < 100m, 1m
−1 ρ < 
200m−1 . For each run in the ensemble, Ns  = Np  = 10
4 . 
Parameter Min Max 
L0 1 m 100 m 
L1  L0  100 m 
between limits L0  and L1 , and the angle which the segment ρ 10 m
− 1 200m−1 
makes with the y axis is uniformly distributed in the interval 
[−∆θ/2, ∆θ/2], with ∆θ < π (i. e. the intruders  never move 
back towards the their starting point). 
The simulation  proceeds by generating  a number  (Ntrials ) 
of random sensor fields. For each sensor field, a set of random 
intruder  paths is generated which are tested for overlap with 
the sensors. We specify  the total number of random  sensors 
and paths (Ns  and Np ), and Ntrials , the number of trials, is 
derived  as follows. The expectation value of the number of 
sensors in a trial is given by (ns ) = ρw. We then calculate 
the expected number of trials, Ntrials = Ns /(ns ). The number 
of paths per trial is then np = Np /Ntrials . 
For each trial, the number of sensors is selected randomly 
from a  Poisson   distribution of  mean (ns ), and these  are 
randomly distributed over the sensing region. For each trial 
field, np  paths are created with random starting points at the 
top edge of the field. Each path is tested for overlap with the 
sensors. Trials are continued until the total number of sensors 
deployed  is ≥ Ns . The mean detection  probability is then 
given by the fraction of paths which intersected  a sensor. 
The simulation also computes the weak barrier formation 
probability, and the mean weak barrier coverage  fraction 
(which is equivalent to P⊥, since it represents the fraction of 
the barrier that is covered to orthogonal paths). Both of these 
quantities  can be derived from a given sensor field using the 
algorithm due to [17]. Figure 5-a shows results for w = 2000m 
and h = 100m. Markers show the simulation  results for weak 
coverage fraction and weak barrier probability,  the lines show 
the analytical formulae for P⊥ and PW . The simulation and 
analytical  results are in very good agreement. 
∆θ 0 π 
The results of the runs are shown in Figure 5b. Each marker 
represents  one simulation run (a full  set  of  trials with  a 
randomly chosen  set  of path distribution parameters).  The 
solid lines represent the analytical values for P⊥ and DetQM0 , 
the value of DetQM with pt   = 0 (no trespasser’s  favorite 
paths). All  the simulation points are bounded  between these 
two curves. As expected, P⊥ represents  a lower limit on the 
detection  probability. The simulation shows  that even  with 
quite extreme values for the path selection parameters, DetQM 
overestimates the detection probability if trespassers’ favorite 
paths are ignored. 
 
B. Network Segmentation and Communication 
In this section LDG’s performance is compared against the 
well-known DSR protocol [23]. Both DSR and LDG use on- 
demand route discovery  and maintenance mechanisms. DSR 
is recognized  as one of the most suitable routing protocols for 
LWSNs [10]. It is widely cited in the literature and several 
trusted and well-tested DSR implementations  are available on 
various network simulators. DSR and LDG were implemented 
in the NS2 network simulator [24]. 
1) Performance Metrics: In this subsection, we define the 
metrics used to measure the performance of the LDG protocol. 
1) Average  End-to-End Delay: Let Delayi   be the time 
separating the transmission of a packet i from the source 
node and its reception  at destination. Let PT   be the 
total number of packets that are correctly  received. The 
average end-to-end delay is given  as 
To investigate the effects of intruder paths on the detection 
probability, we performed an ensemble of simulations.  Each 
 
D = 
i...Ns 
Delayi 
 
second 
PT 
 No. of nodes 200 
Simulation  area (200m×200m) Square 
BSN radio range 50m 
Source BSN data rate 1pkt/s 
No. of MTs 3 
Radio Bandwidth 250 Kbps 
Data packet size 32 byte 
 
 
 
2) Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): PDR is expressed  as 
the ratio between the number of packets successfully 
delivered  to a destination   and the number of packets 
sent by source node. PDR can be presented  as 
no. of delivered packets 
Table I 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
P DR = 
no. of sent packets 
3) Network Lifetime: This metric shows the ability of the 
routing protocol to load balance energy consumption. 
We define this metric  as the average lifetime of all BSNs. 
This metric is calculated  as 
N L = 
1...Ns 
T Ei − T S 
Ns 
where T S is the starting time of the network simulation, 
and T Ei is the time when i dies. If i remains alive during 
the entire simulation  experiment, T Ei  will be set to the 
simulation  end time. 
4) Total Throughput:  Measures the number  of packets 
successfully transmitted to the final destination per unit 
of time. This metric is calculated by dividing the cu- 
mulative size of all received data by the duration of the 
simulation experiment. It is presented  as 
no. of received packets × packet size 
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Figure 6.  a. Average End-to-End  delays of LDG and DSR. b. PDR of LDG 
and DSR. 
T = 
simulation time 
bit/second  
D. Results and Discussion 
5) Normalized Routing Load (NRL): The NRL is defined 
as the average number of control packets transmitted per 
data packet delivered to the sink node. It is presented  as 
no. of control packets 
N RL = 
no. of data packets 
6) Average Energy Consumption  (AvEC): The AvEC 
measures the amount of power consumed at each BSN 
during the network operation. In NS-2, the calculation of 
energy expenditure at each node takes into account the 
power consumed for packet transmission and reception, 
the one consumed  during the time where the radio 
is in  sleep mode, and the energy consumed  by the 
environment  sensing operations (sensor boards). AvEC 
on each node is calculated  as 
AvEC = 
Energy (I − R) 
Ns 
where I is the initial energy level of a node, and R is 
its remaining energy at the end of the simulation. 
 
C. Simulation Model 
 
The simulated LWSN contains 200 stationary BSNs, which 
are randomly scattered within an area of 2000m×100m. BSNs 
have a wireless  transmission  range of 50m and sensing range 
of 25m. Each simulated network contains three MTs. Two of 
them are located on both extremities of the network chain, and 
one in the middle.  These nodes are assumed more powerful  in 
terms of energy capacity and wireless communication  range. 
During the simulation time of 100s, a  subset  of BSNs is 
periodically  and randomly chosen to generate the data traffic 
load and send it to the MTs. The sender’s traffic load as well 
as the data packet size are maintained constantly throughout 
the simulation time. Table I summarizes the parameter settings 
used in our simulation experiments. 
 
1) Average End-to-End Delay: Figure 6a shows the varia- 
tion of average end-to-end delays for both LDG and DSR,  as 
a function of simulation time. LDG generates shorter packet 
delivery delays compared to DSR during the entire simula- 
tion time. The performance gap between the two protocols 
attains  its maximum during the first 40s of the simulation 
time. When t =  5s, one packet transmission  with  DSR 
took 220ms, while it was  reduced  by 95% and took 5ms 
in LDG. This is explained  by the differences  in the route 
discovery  mechanisms of each protocol.  During the network 
initialization phase,  almost every  operation  of data packet 
transmission requires a route discovery step, due to the absence 
of previously  discovered paths. In LDG, this step takes into 
account the chain topology nature of the LWSN by dividing the 
network into small logical levels. The route discovery process 
is executed  in a  localized manner  within each level only, 
requiring  shorter time to converge compared to DSR. In the 
latter, route request packets are flooded throughout  the entire 
network, adding extra delays to the route discovery  phase, and 
hence to the whole process of packet transmission. 
After second 40 of the simulation time, the performance 
gap between  LDG and DSR becomes smaller,  but remains 
considerable. This is due to the difference in discovered routes 
quality between LDG and DSR. Adopting multi-level network 
partitioning in LDG allows sending nodes to discover shorter 
and more reliable paths to the MTs. Shorter  paths result in 
shorter end-to-end delays due the small number of forwarding 
nodes in each route. In addition, considering link reliability 
when selecting  routes in LDG helps to reduce the delivery 
delay and the number of retransmissions. 
2) PDR: As shown in Figure 6b, LDG achieves  higher 
PDR when compared to DSR. The average PDR performance 
gain averages around  20% all along the simulation period. 
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Figure 7.   a.  Network lifetime results  of LDG and DSR. b. Throughput 
simulation results of LDG and DSR. 
 
 
It can be observed  also that LDG offers higher PDR from 
the early network initialization phase, it reaches 90% in less 
than 3 seconds. While DSR spends 21 seconds for the PDR 
to reach 70%. The high PDR in LDG is a direct  consequence 
of the reduced route setup overhead. LDG relies on localized 
communication   between nodes belonging  to the same  level 
to establish  a route  between the data originator  and the MT. 
Moreover, LDG uses  links reliability to determine the best 
path. In contrast, DSR is heavily based on flooding  the network 
with a high number of control  messages. This causes increased 
contention, congestion, and collisions, preventing this protocol 
from being able to successfully  deliver more than 30% of 
the transmitted  data packets. DSR does not have an effective 
mechanism to remove route caches, which contain broken or 
non-minimum hop routes. Using stale routes leads to loss of 
data packets and wastes network  bandwidth.  This problem is 
further exacerbated by route replies from intermediate  nodes 
and snooping data packets. 
3) Network Life:  The results in Figure 7a highlights the 
lifetime of each BSN in both LDG and DSR networks. BSNs 
showing shorter  lifetime are seen  when LDG is used.  The 
plots demonstrate that the number of BSNs with a lifetime un- 
der 96s is higher in the case of LDG, compared to DSR. This 
is mainly caused by the multi-level communication  adopted 
in LDG. Although this technique considerably minimizes the 
routing overhead,  it  may sometimes  cause  the overuse  of 
some nodes that are responsible for routing  messages between 
consecutive levels. It is important to note that load balancing 
is one of DSR’s  main design factors;  it supports the use of 
multiple routes to any destination for load balancing. However, 
for the global network lifetime, LDG outperforms DSR, with 
a higher  number  of BSNs that remain alive until the end of 
the simulation. This can be confirmed when comparing the 
average node’s lifetime for each routing protocol. It is shown 
that this value is a higher  in LDG than in DSR. 
4) Throughput: During the initialization phase, LDG and 
DSR showed opposite  behaviors  in their throughput perfor- 
mance (Figure 7b). Drastic degradation in throughput occurred 
with DSR during the first 5 seconds of simulation  time, and a 
minimum value of 20kb/s has been measured. This poor per- 
formance is due to the high number of route request/route reply 
messages generated in DSR during this particular  phase, which 
results in congestion, and reduces the available bandwidth  for 
a b 
 
Figure 8. a. Simulation  results of NLR for LDG and DSR. b. Average Energy 
consumption in LDG and DSR. 
 
 
data packet transmission.  Unlike  DSR, LDG showed  better 
performance during this phase, where the throughput increased 
with a higher  load of data traffic, reaching a maximum  value 
of 100K b/s. When the network  attained  a steady state, both 
LDG and DSR showed a stable throughput,  with higher values 
for LDG that outperforms DSR by 60%. This proves the ability 
of LDG to carry out routing operations in a transparent  and 
lightweight manner without affecting the rate of successful 
data packet delivery. In DSR, when an intermediate  BSN 
receives a bad route reply,it retries to send the waiting  packets 
along that route. When  a link along that route fails, an error 
packet is sent back to the sources, which then issue  a new 
route request  packet,  starting the discovery  all over again. 
Attempting to salvage a packet using another bad route results 
in a waste of bandwidth and increased delivery  delay. 
5) NRL: Figure 8a provides the measurements of the NRL 
for LDG and DSR. Higher values  of routing overhead  are 
generated for both protocols at the beginning of the simulation 
experiments.  This is logical since any packet transmission 
during this phase necessitates a route  discovery  process, due 
to the lack of  previously discovered  routes. However, we 
note that DSR requires more routing traffic load than LDG 
for  this particular phase.  In  fact, LDG recorded  an NRL 
value below 240, while this metric was above 260 for DSR. 
The reduced  routing overhead  in LDG is achieved  due to 
multi-level network partitioning  based on link reliability and 
BSN residual energy. In contrast to DSR, all routing packet 
transmissions  are localized in  LDG  and no network-wide 
flooding is required. It can also be observed from Figure 8a 
that LDG reached the NRL steady state earlier than DSR. By 
the NRL steady state, we mean the ability BSNs to send data 
packets using cached routes  with a  minimum or null NRL. 
LDG needed  less than 2 seconds  to be able to send data 
packets without the need for routing messages (N RL = 0), 
while DSR needed more than 5 seconds. The data salvaging 
and gratuitous replies of DSR degrades its performance when 
routes are fresh. 
6) Energy Consumption:  The plots in Figure 8b reveal 
comparable performance of DSR and LDG in terms of average 
energy consumption with slight improvement in LDG. Both 
protocols  consume less energy as the data traffic  load decreases 
towards  the end of simulation. Furthermore,  the maximum 
value of average energy consumption  (20 Joules) recorded by 
 
 
 
LDG during a high data traffic load can be considered good 
performance for a  LWSN. The total energy consumption  is 
mainly due to overhearing. Since this is highly dependent on 
the sender’s radio range, LDG is based on dynamically varying 
the radio range to reduce total amount of consumed energy. 
This also saves energy at the sender by not transmitting at full 
power at all times. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
WSNs possess  many key  features that contribute to their 
effectiveness  as a border  surveillance  technology.  This paper 
studied the complex and sometimes conflicting requirements 
for such a  WSN system.  After determining  that detection 
probability or orthogonal  paths is an appropriate metric for 
measuring the crossing detection quality of the LWSN, we pre- 
sented a method  that calculates the required network density 
to achieve the specified level of coverage, while maintaining 
radio connectivity within the network. Then, given the required 
number of sensor nodes to deploy to achieve a specified  level 
of coverage according to the chosen metric, we addressed the 
problem of determining the quality of coverage in the deployed 
network. The second major contribution presented in this paper 
is to the development of a cross-layer  routing protocol that 
is energy efficient  and maintains critical QoS measures, such 
as timeliness and accuracy. Despite using international  border 
monitoring and surveillance   as an application  scenario, the 
proposed methods and protocols are generic and can be applied 
to any topologically linear WSN application,  such as railway 
or gas pipeline  monitoring. 
Future avenues of work include implementing the system on 
a hardware platform  and testing it with real life scenarios, such 
as  various intrusion models, complex terrains and different 
sensing  modalities. Currently, the authors  are building 50 
WiFi-based  BSNs, which are equipped  with accelerometer 
vibration sensors. This hardware platform  is designed to accept 
a broad  range  of sensor types,  which will  allow testing the 
proposed system in other applications such as  gas  pipeline 
monitoring. 
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